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R ecently mobility has beco-me an increasingly impor- tant issue in relation to so-
cial as well as urban contexts. 
Global movements of capital, commodities and mig-
rants, the explosion of tourism and increasing virtual 
travelling are radically changing societal structures 
and conditions of social action, while the continued ex-
pansion of urbanisation into the countryside is bring-
ing mobility forth as an ever more significant urban 
issue. Importantly, also politics and power are affected 
by mobility: today the mobile seem to be the power-
ful, and in face of increasing global mobility politics 
seems, to a large extent, to remain local and immo-
bile. Hence, mobility is proposed as key concept for a 
reorientation of social theory that transcends the na-
tion-state framed concept of “society”.1  Meanwhile, in 
urban theory, mobility surfaces in a variety of contexts 
that relates it to, for instance, public space, social net-
works and disputes about access to urbanity through 
collective or individual transportation.
Not surprisingly, mobility is also a highly contested 
issue in both social and urban terms. This is obvious, 
especially if mobility is thought of in terms of power, a 
context in which the legitimacy of such power is im-
mediately, and significantly, questioned. But one could 
also ask, in more general terms, how and in which ways 
mobilities are justified and criticised. 
In this article we sketch a way of dealing with such 
questions by integrating them into the regimes of justi-
fication presented by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Théve-
not (1991, 2000) and Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello 
(1999). We find their idea of a plurality of different and 
mutually contesting regimes of justification mobilised 
in public disputes convincing, and suggest that they 
also provide a fruitful framework to discuss the dyna-
mics of public disputes about mobility and urbanity. 
Mobility
Four points to start with: Firstly, mobility is not a uni-
versal phenomenon. It is not, so to say, a human con-
dition. As Bauman argues, mobility differentiates the 
human condition rather than unifying it. Whereas mo-
bility is a matter of choice for some, for others it is a fate. 
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Concomitantly, mobility as destiny and mobility as fate 
are different. And such divisions point towards different 
social topologies of mobility. Whereas increasing mobi-
lity can bring liberation in one social topology, it can 
create hell in another.2  
Secondly, mobility is a relational concept. As Virilio 
puts it, “[s]peed is not a phenomenon, it is the relation-
ship between phenomena”.3  One’s mobility may well 
be another’s immobility. More importantly, the immo-
bile “stand-ins” can contribute considerably to the sta-
bilisation of the mobile, reticular world today.4  
Thirdly, there is not a single type of mobility. Fol-
lowing Virilio (1995) again, we can operate with three 
kinds of mobility. These are related: firstly, to transpor-
tation; secondly, to transmission, that is, to the infor-
mation and communication networks; and thirdly, to 
what Virilio calls “transplant”, that is, to internalisation 
of technology in the human body like in the case of 
cyborg technologies. But, crucially, in all these three 
forms, mobility is a paradoxical concept. Taken to their 
extremes, all three forms of mobility result in inertia.5  
To give an example, the high point of mobility, the Ko-
sovo War, took place in network space. As Virilio wrote, 
during this war, 
the soldiers stayed mostly in their barracks! In this way 
... inertia has truly become a mass phenomenon. And 
not only for the TV audiences watching the war at home 
but also for the army that watches the battle from the 
barracks. Today the army only occupies the territory 
once the war is over.6  
Hence, one of the consequences of mobility may be 
immobility. This is, perhaps, the dialectic of mobility.
In our framework, there is a fourth form of mobility, 
which has nothing to do with physical movement. In this 
context Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “nomadism” 
is particularly interesting. Nomadism is associated with a 
particular sort of mobility, which is not linear, that is, di-
rected from a fixed point to another, but which “deviates 
to a minimum extent”. Hence, the opposition between 
the Nomad and the non-Nomad is not that of the mobile 
and the immobile. The opposition is between speed and 
movement. Speed means, above all, a deviation, howe-
ver slowly from fixation and linear movement.7  It is thus 
by speed, and not necessarily by physical movement, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s “nomadic space” is constructed. 
Likewise, Bauman’s “exile” creates, by staying “non-so-
cialized”, or “non-integrated”, “a place of one’s own”.8  It 
is no surprise, then, some philosophers, who are often 
criticised for “romanticising” mobility, are in fact not so 
keen on travelling. Hence, “you shouldn’t move around 
too much, or you’ll stifle becomings”, says Deleuze. He 
adds, by referring to Toynbee: “the nomads are those 
who don’t move on, they become nomads because they 
refuse to disappear”.9 
And fourthly, we think of mobility in terms of power 
and justification. Indeed, mobility seems to be the 
most important factor of power and stratification to-
day.10  The re-distribution of power and freedom today 
seems to take place in relation to mobility, which also 
makes it necessary to “politicise speed”.11 As Paul Virilio 
puts it: 
Wealth is the hidden side of speed and speed the hid-
den side of wealth... People say: ‘You are too rich’, but 
no one ever says: ‘You are too fast’. But they are related. 
There is a violence in wealth that has been understood; 
not so with speed.12  
Power is basically about the capacity of action at a dis-
tance. As Luc Boltanski suggests, “action at a distance” 
is the “very attribute which describes in the most con-
cise and striking fashion the intuitive content of the 
idea of power”.13  Mobility is what makes action at a dis-
tance possible.
If mobility is related to power, then, of course, it is 
also related to justification and critique. Power needs 
legitimation (justification) and legitimation can be de-
legitimized by critique. But in what sense is mobility re-
lated to justification and critique? This question is cen-
tral for our argument. Our point of departure here is 
that critique is based on justification. Justifications can 
only be criticised on the basis of other justifications. 
In order to understand critique we therefore need to 
understand how we justify. We need a theory of criti-
que just as well as a critical theory of mobility. We are 
interested in a “sociology of criticism” as well as a “cri-
tical sociology” in the context of mobility.14  We need 
to investigate how different forms of critique (on mo-
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bility) are grounded rather than doing a research that 
grounds a certain form of critique.
Regimes of justification
How does one justify one’s critique, then? Boltanski 
and Thévenot in their book on justification (1991) give 
the following answer to this question. People engaged 
in public dispute and critique refer to different regimes 
or worlds of justification, each with their own criteria 
of validity and internal consistency.15  Such regimes of 
justification make it possible for situated actors to en-
gage in disputes with others on the “common good”.16  
Regimes of justification do not have a normative con-
notation in the sense of the telos of communicative 
rationality in Habermas’ understanding.17  Rather, they 
establish different registers of grandeur and of denun-
ciation to be employed in disputes. Neither do they im-
ply a search for consensus. Consensus is possible only 
within a given regime of justification – across different 
regimes only compromise is achievable.18 
Several regimes of justification exist simultan-
eously. Boltanski and Thévenot register 6 different re-
gimes of justification in their 1991 study. These are the 
regimes of inspiration, opinion, domesticity, civility, 
market, and industry. With this notion of a limited set 
of regimes of justification, Boltanski and Thévenot try 
to find a middle ground between “formal universalism 
and the kind of unlimited pluralism which has often 
been the response of empirical disciplines like history 
or sociology to transcendental stances”.19 
Each regime is based on “a principle of equivalence” 
“that enables ... apparently distant conditions to be 
brought together”.20  Likewise, each regime of justifica-
tion engages a definition of humanity and a set of over-
arching principles in relation to the “common good”. 
To be sure, the (limited) plurality and simultaneous 
existence of the regimes resembles the idea of a dif-
ferentiated modernity (based on the notions of auto-
nomous fields or autopoietic systems). But, in contrast 
to theories of differentiation, Boltanski and Thévenot 
also allow for de-differentiation. Hence, the principle 
of “equivalence is not related to different groups ... but 
to different situations”.21  Furthermore, they are not 
only interested in knowing what is happening within 
a single regime of justification, but also in situations in 
which different regimes clash or compromise with one 
another. What is of interest is not only intra-regime but 
also inter-regime relations such as criticism, conflict or 
compromise. 
This idea is important in relation to the discussion 
of mobility. But first we would like to mention how we 
think that mobility is seen, justified or criticised from 
within different regimes of justification. 
1. Mobility as inspiration
The regime of inspiration is characterised by the gran-
deur of inspiration, spontaneity, feelings, singularity, ori-
ginality, creativity and movement. What is important 
here is to avoid routines and habits, to free oneself from 
the inertia that is inherent in “having knowledge”.22  
Inspiration is about “receiving the mystical alchemy of 
creativity” in transgressing oneself.23  
Within this regime of justification, mobility is a tool, 
with which what is seen as static is criticised. In this con-
text, concepts such as nomadism, exile, “walking”, “tac-
tics”, and displacement are associated with resistance 
to and emancipation from the sedentary power. Thus, 
Deleuze & Guattari’s “rhizome”, for instance, develops 
according to the logic of transversal movement, reti-
cular connection, multiplicity, and becoming, and it is 
juxtaposed to static, linear, and striated “roots”. They 
wrote: 
Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! ... Run lines, never 
plot a point! Speed turns the point into a line! Be quick, 
even when standing still! ... Don’t have just ideas, just 
have an idea.... Have short-term ideas.24  
Retrospectively, one could say that mobility once 
promised emancipation. It is striking that even in the 
1990s, this idea of mobility as emancipation was alive 
and well (and probably still is). Thus, Edward Said wrote 
in Culture and Imperialism:
... liberation as an intellectual mission ... has now shif-
ted from the settled, established, and domesticated dy-
namics of culture to its unhoused, decentred, and exilic 
energies, energies whose incarnation today is the mig-
rant....25  
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This optimism of mobility (as inspiration) was closely rela-
ted to aesthetic modernity.26  Aesthetic modernity was, 
above all, a reaction against the solidity of the organi-
sed-industrialist vision of modernity.
2. Mobility within the industrial regime
In the industrial regime, with its technological objects 
and scientific methods, grandeur is about efficiency, 
performance, productivity, predicting, ensuring func-
tionality and giving utilitarian answers to “needs”. 
Operational objects and professional experts count as 
“grand”. Unproductive people and dysfunctional ob-
jects count as “small”. Here, expert-knowledge, belief 
in progress, and planning and organization are given 
pride of place.27 
In the context of modernity, social engineers and 
planners have always been interested in mobility. Ac-
cording to Le Corbusier, for instance, the modern city 
and modern life were to be shaped by the new crite-
ria of speed, comfort and efficiency.28  Traffic planning, 
suburbanisation and neutralisation of the urban en-
vironments (through land-use planning according to 
the logic of industrial efficiency): to be sure, mobility is 
what made all this possible. 
Consequently, the industrial regime has progres-
sively normalised mobility in daily life. Hence, trans-
portation has become an integral, taken-for-gran-
ted part of both planning processes and everyday 
activities since the 19th century. Similarly today, al-
most all IT-projects related to “connecting” people are 
supported by authorities.29  
Importantly, the shift from Fordism to Post-For-
dism has accentuated the question of mobility. In this 
context, some writers even argue that “economies of 
speed replace economies of scale”.30  It is therefore no 
coincidence that mobility is an integral concept of 
much critical work on the present state of capitalism 
and social life.31  
3. Mobility in the market regime
In the market regime, grandeur is competitiveness, 
richness, the desire for scarce goods, and a willingness 
to take risks. Short-term, rather than long-term pro-
jects count more within this regime. What is “small” 
is being a loser, or having a product that does not sell 
(well).32 
Marx pointed out the contradiction between in-
dustrial capital, which seeks to establish a planned or 
organised process of production, and merchants and 
finance capital, which seek profits via marketing and 
speculation. Regarding mobility, this has placed capi-
tal under the contradiction of the fixed and the fluid, 
stock and flow, the immobile and the mobile. Within 
the market regime, risk-taking on the basis of mobility 
is, still, a positive value, and increasingly so.
4. Mobility as opinion
In the regime of opinion, the grandeur is in the recog-
nition of others. To be visible, to have publicity, to 
influence, attract and seduce others are the preferred 
values. What is undesirable is to be forgotten, hidden 
and to appear as a blurred image.33 
Being able to move in accordance with public opini-
on is in this regime grand. Within this regime, you “have 
a standpoint until you take a new one”, as a Danish so-
cial democratic prime minister has put it.34  Keeping in 
touch with the recognition of others by moving aro-
und, showing up everywhere, locally or in the media, 
or worshipping the stars by following them around is 
grand. However, by being too mobile you may also lose 
recognition, you may be known for being someone 
with whom it is “difficult” to get in touch. 
5. Mobility against community – the regime of do-
mesticity
In the regime of domesticity, the grandeur is personal 
trust among the members of a collective, a tradition, a 
community, a generation, a family or a hierarchy. Good 
manners, respect and responsibility, family and me-
mory are valuable; egoism is undesirable.35 
Within this regime, freedom and/or mobility do not 
necessarily lead to happiness. Mobility is most often 
associated with flows of capital and global interde-
pendencies. As against these flows, belonging to a ter-
ritory and “roots” are held to be more valuable. A good 
example of justification within this regime is thus com-
munitarianism. Practical disputes in this context are 
about defending a territory, a heritage, a nation, or a 
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tradition against the ex-territorial, seamless and root-
less flows of global capital and technology. In Castells’ 
terminology: the “space of places” is defended against 
the “space of flows”.
In these global space wars, “territorialisation” – not 
only in the geographical but also in the social and cul-
tural sense – becomes the magic answer to all the un-
certainties caused by global mobility. The domain of 
the “home” becomes the shelter against the horrors of 
deterritorialised capitalism.
It is of course not evident that increasing mobility 
automatically causes the disappearance of proximity – 
for instance, the car may make it possible to get to oth-
ers as well as to escape from others.36  It is not evident 
either that proximity and co-presence are the same 
things. But within the regime of domesticity these are 
simply taken for granted. 
6. The civic regime and mobility
In the civic world, the grandeur is common will and 
equality. Here it does not depend on persons, but on 
collectivities and representation. The grandeur is to 
subordinate to the collective will, to have a mandate, 
to be delegated, to act legally. What is undesirable is 
fractions, corporatism, and individualism.37  
Whereas the argument against mobility seems to 
favour “territorialisation” within the regime of domes-
ticity, within the civic regime of justification the argu-
ment seems to be “slowing down”. 
Within this regime, mobility and speed are the ene-
mies of politics and reflection. Democracy, debate, and 
civic life require concentration, and in this sense mobi-
lity is “small”. This form of justification is easy to find in 
the works of Sennett, Bauman and Virilio.
It is now thirty years ago that Richard Sennett wrote 
his famous book on urban sociology: The Uses of Dis-
order. Here he argued for “disorder” and displacement 
against the panoptic enclosures (zoning and segrega-
tion) of the modern city. The chaotic and mobile city, 
proposed by Sennett in this early work, seemed to pro-
mise its citizens chances of exposure to beneficial en-
counters with strangers by subverting, moving across, or 
escaping from the enclosures of the “ordered” city. 
But, interestingly, Sennett is writing in a different 
tone today. In his recent writing he argues that we have 
to revise our “fear of discipline”, that the contemporary 
city also needs “disciplinary spaces”, that is, “spaces of 
democracy”, against increasing mobility.38  
Mobility is also what Virilio’s concept of “trans-poli-
tics” is all about: the end of politics, understood as 
time for reflection and dialogue. “Democracy … requi-
res time”.39  
[W]e no longer have time for reflection. The power of 
speed is that. Democracy is no longer in the hands of 
men, it is in the hands of computerized instruments, 
answering machines, etc.40  
Hence speed, according to Virilio, is in a sense, “bey-
ond” politics.41 
Speed beyond politics: this theme surfaces in 
Bauman’s recent work too. Referring to Castells, Bau-
man argues that global power is increasingly liberated 
from politics; whereas power belongs to the “space 
of flows”, politics remains “hopelessly local”.42  Power 
is ex-territorial, whereas politics remains territorial. 
The speed of ex-territorial power is what enables it to 
escape the agora, the space in which private fears are 
translated into “political” issues.43  
Power is the capacity to escape. The instruments of 
power are thus fluidity, liquidity, speed and movement. 
This relates, for Bauman, to a major shift in relation to 
modernity and capitalism. The new phase of modernity 
is “liquid modernity”, which operates according to the 
logic of dis-embedding without re-embedding. De-
territorialisation without re-territorialisation. In this 
sense, liquid modernity signals “the revenge of noma-
dism”.44  
Following this logic, the question becomes: where 
is the political equivalent of global nomadic power? 
We don’t have fast-moving political institutions. The 
existing political institutions are unfit in the face of 
nomadic power. Confronted with the increasing gap 
between power and politics, Bauman’s question be-
comes how can we “slow down” the new nomads, the 
movements of power? Slowing down, without neces-
sarily “territorialising”. That’s also to say, how can we re-
invent politics? 
Against Bauman one could insert the idea that po-
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litics is also about delegation and representation. 
Politicians are delegated to move away in order to re-
present the electorate; the electorate has handed over 
their votes, and their voices, to politicians. To be sure, 
politics moves slower than global capital, but the argu-
ment that politics today is “hopelessly local” seems, at 
least to an extent, to overlap with the arguments from 
within the domestic regime. 
Justification: Compromise and  (peaceful) conflict
As should be clear by now, different regimes come up 
with different and conflicting justifications. But there 
are also possibilities for compromise. To give an ex-
ample, let us dwell on how the possibilities of conflict 
and compromise are observed from the regime of in-
spiration. 
Seen from the regime of inspiration, all other regi-
mes suffer from considering stability as “grand”: norms, 
principles, traditions, promises, plans, predictions, 
commitments, objectivity, and expertise. The regime 
of domesticity, particularly, is seen to be mistaken, 
because it clearly prioritises personal and traditional 
bonds, “roots”, against moving on. On the other hand, 
seen from the world of domesticity, the regime of in-
spiration lacks self-control, a sense of order, respect 
for hierarchies, habits, and the meaning of gradual 
change.45 
Hence, a straightforward compromise between 
these two regimes seems difficult to attain. Roots and 
routes, tradition and innovation, territorialisation and 
deterritorialisation seem to conflict with each other, 
although one can territorialise only to deterritorialise 
again (Deleuze). But a compromise between the regime 
of inspiration and the regime of domesticity can be 
found in the context of Deleuze & Guattari’s concept 
of “micro-fascism”. They deal with fascism as a micro-
politics of becoming based on rhizomatic movements 
– which they also perceive as the real strength of fas-
cism. What is at stake here is that although fascism 
speaks the language of an internally non-antagonistic 
community, “us” versus “them” and so on, it has indeed 
a rhizomatic, innovative, mobile structure. Micro-fascism 
is, in other words, a compromise between the two re-
gimes of justification in contrast to the authoritarian 
state.46  
Another example: compromising with the market 
regime means submission to money, seen from the re-
gime of inspiration. The commercialisation of the “con-
cept”, for instance, is the danger here.47  And from the 
point of view of the market regime, the regime of in-
spiration lacks distance and cold-bloodedness. It can-
not take hold of chances and thus drive business. Ne-
vertheless, the inspired “act of madness” can succeed 
also in business life.48  Thus, Anita Roddick, the owner 
of Body Shop, can be keen on presenting herself as a 
nomad: “I am such a nomad, such a tramp”.49  Marketing 
of nomadism is everywhere today. 
So, compromises exist. But conflict often prevails. 
Let’s now have a look at mobility and community again. 
From within the regime of domesticity, Robert Putnam 
draws attention to the stressful relation between rising 
mobility and diminishing social capital.50  On the other 
hand, John Urry points out – from within the indu-
strial regime, it seems – that mobility does not cause 
social capital to diminish, rather it contributes to the 
accumulation of social capital. To be able to maintain 
social networks, you need mobility. Network mobility 
reshapes the relationship between physical and social 
proximity. It was supposed by classical social theory 
that community, for instance, requires both physical 
and social proximity; but mobility seems to make soci-
al relationships possible in spite of geographical dis-
tance.51  Putnam seems to propose “slowing down” as a 
political/ethical alternative; whereas Urry stresses the 
importance of equality of access to mobility: a “socially 
inclusive society” is, in this perspective, a society that 
can minimise “immobility” and maximise conditions 
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Both Sennett and Bauman argue that excessive 
mobility results in the disappearance of public spaces 
and politics. Speed means moving through the city 
in passivity. Against this, Mimi Sheller and John Urry 
state that mobility is necessary to get people to public 
spaces! From this perspective, mobility is what holds 
social networks together. If the “old” public spaces dis-
appear, then new ones emerge: for instance, the me-
dia, the smart car, and so on. These new public spaces 
also combine different mobilities (transportation and 
communication) so that the conditions of possibility of 
communication and thus political action are significantly 
increased.53  
As should be clear by now, both perspectives are 
internally consistent, or, we could say both perspec-
tives are right (or wrong): mobility is both related to 
participation in networks and to slowing down – social 
capital is related to both co-presence and movement. 
This is, we believe, also the inherent ambivalence of 
mobility. 
Mobility as violence: Power above justification?
So far so good, it may seem. However, there are some 
holes and cracks in our story. Is John Urry really arguing 
from within an industrial regime? Does Bauman, after 
all, not have a good point in stressing the global aspect 
of power as against the local-ness of politics? 
There seem to be two alternative ways out of this situa-
tion. Firstly, one can argue that mobility also makes it pos-
sible to raise above the six regimes previously outlined, 
and one can try to justify this argument from within one 
or more of the six regimes of justification. And secondly, 
one can ask if there is emerging a new, 7th regime of ju-
stification – a mobile regime, so to speak. Boltanski & 
Chiapello in their book on the new spirit of capitalism 
(1999) follow this route. Let’s have a look at both of 
these. 
In the first case, the idea is that power is above justi-
fication. “Speed is violence. The most obvious example 
is my fist,” says Virilio.54  So, there is more to the world of 
humans and non-humans than justification by equi-
valence. Boltanski and Thévenot suggest that there is 
a regime of violence, which is beyond any principle of 
equivalence – a regime that is located at the “limits” of 
justice/justification.55  Likewise, a regime of love is bey-
ond the rule of equivalence. In general, four modes of 
action can be distinguished, as shown in the following 
diagram:56 
Now let’s have a look at liquid modernity, global 
interdependencies and mobility as power above justi-
fication, that is, as violence.
The main argument here is that the mobile elite 
seem to be outside, or above, the regimes of justifica-
tion; in this sense, it is non-commitment that charac-
terizes the behaviour of mobile elites.57  The easier you 
change location, profession or environment, that is, 
the more mobile you are, the less tied down (by com-
mitments) you are. In this context, property is a misle-
ading concept to discuss the social divisions of today. 
Property means attachment and commitment. Pea-
sants, shopkeepers and others who have property are 
not necessarily privileged any longer. The new global 
elites
do not own factories, lands, nor occupy administrative 
positions. Their wealth comes from a portable asset: 
their knowledge of the laws of the labyrinth ... [they] 
love to create, play and be on the move.58  
In liquid modernity power lies in the ability to “travel 
light”.59  If you are a light traveller, your privilege is to 
be outside Boltanski & Thévenot’s regimes of justifica-
tion.
Max Weber noted that the separation of businesses 
from the household had created a neutral empty space 
for businesses which became free from ethical constrain-
ts. The state’s legislative power had then imposed ethi-
cal constraints on this void. But now, businesses are li-
berating themselves from the national state60  and yet, 
Bauman points out, there is no equivalent to the na-
tion-state-like legislative power. There is no regime of 
justice that can impose restrictions on global power.
A seventh regime: The project regime
The other route is to ask if a new 7th regime of justifica-
tion has developed within liquid capitalism, a regime 
adjusted to mobilities and networks. This is what Bol-
tanski & Chiapello argue in their recent book.
In the 7th regime, the “project regime” (cité par pro-
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jets61 ), the activity of the mediator that establishes 
and extends networks is of value in and of itself.62  The 
general equivalent is activity (of whatever kind). Acti-
vity transcends the distinctions between labour and 
non-labour, wage and non-wage, interested or bene-
volent, measurable or non-measurable according to 
productivity. The aim of the activity is to generate pro-
jects or to integrate oneself into projects initiated by 
others. The project is always limited in time. Grandeur 
is, therefore, living a life of simultaneous and succes-
sive projects, the more diverse the better. What counts 
is always being on the move towards another project, 
always preparing, always coming up with some new 
idea.63 
The project-form is well adjusted to a world of net-
works precisely because it is a transitory form: 
the succession of projects extends the networks by 
multiplying the connections and making the links pro-
liferate.64  
Those who do not have projects or do not explore net-
works are threatened by exclusion, and exclusion is 
the same as “death” in a reticular world. Therefore it is 
important always to develop oneself and one’s employ-
ability.
In this connectionist world, the most important va-
lue is to connect to others. In order to do that one needs 
the ability to trust others, to know how to communi-
cate, to freely discuss and also how to adapt to others 
and to new situations. One should be “physically and 
intellectually mobile”, and be able to answer the call of 
“a moving world”.65  Rather than sticking to your own 
stable skills, you should be flexible and polyvalent, and 
you should do this on your own responsibility, autono-
mously. That is, the risk of connecting is yours. 
The new grandeur is being at ease everywhere, 
while at the same time knowing how to be local. The 
“connectionist man” knows how to be present and 
personal in differing contexts and how to judge the 
emotional states of others. 
In this reticular world, a stable habitus (Bourdieu) is 
not desirable. Rather, the grand person is the one who 
is able to link different domains and fields to one an-
other, and to distance oneself from one’s own environ-
ment and immediate circle of relations. 
All these competencies can of course be used indivi-
dually or egoistically. However, this is not justified in 
the project regime. You should be acting in search of 
the “common good”, that is, in order to engage with 
others, inspire confidence, be tolerant, respect diffe-
rences and pass information to others, so that eve-
ryone can increase her/his “employability”. 
There is, then, an ethical scheme of evaluation that 
pertains to the project regime as well. Face-to-face re-
lations, responsibility, trust, confidence, common expe-
riences, mutual aid, keeping your words, co-operation 
and partnering are the key-words in this context.
But you don’t gain anything without sacrifice in 
the regimes of justification, which also applies to the 
project regime. Within the project regime, one has to 
sacrifice everything that can be a barrier to one’s dis-
posability for another project. “The grand person is 
mobile. Nothing must disturb his displacements. He is 
a ‘nomad’”, say Boltanski and Chiapello.66  This demand 
for lightness means renunciation of stability, roots, lo-
cal attachments, pre-established links. One should not 
distinguish between relations of friendship and profes-
sional relations. Neither should one be burdened by 
one’s own passions and values, nor by attachment to a 
heritage or property. 
So, there seems to be a regime of justification that 
matches the networks of liquid capitalism. You may 
travel light in this connectionist world, but you can do 
it for your own sake or for the common good of the 
connected in a temporary network. This is not a de-
personalised, abstract world; on the contrary, it is, or 
rather it can be, a mobile world full of relations of trust, 
friendship and confidence.
From within the project regime, however, liquid 
capitalism can be criticised only to a limited degree. 
Within this regime, there are limits to Bauman’s light 
traveller, but nevertheless light travelling cannot be 
problematised in itself. If this is to be done, it can only 
be done with reference to other regimes of justifica-
tion. But then the problem of inadequacy, which Bau-
man points out, surfaces again: namely, the situation in 
which mobile power can bypass justification. 
What is needed, therefore, seems to be a concept of 
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critique adequate for liquid capitalism. An immanent 
critique of liquid capitalism. In face of this, Boltanski & 
Chiapello focus on the concept of exploitation, which 
is ignored by theorists of the “connectionist” network 
society. 
Interestingly, in their view, exploitation is directly re-
lated to mobility. Those 
who are exploited in a connectionist world [...] are the 
immobile, sedentary individuals, who thereby contri-
bute to stabilizing the world in which others move 
swiftly. They also increase the mobility of their em-
ployers to the point of ubiquity by fulfilling the function 
of ‘stand-ins’ ... who ensure the maintenance of network 
connections.67 
What is particularly interesting here is the focus on 
vertical rather than horizontal inequality: Boltanski 
& Chiapello do not only speak of “access” to networks 
(Castells, Rifkin, Urry), or of inclusion in autopoietic sub-
systems (Luhmann), but also of exploitation in vertical 
structures. 
The city
We have already discussed some questions relating to 
the city. More generally, cities may be conceived as 
highly complex artefacts involving a heterogeneity of 
things and humans. As such they also give rise to public 
disputes that often involve several regimes of justice. 
Struggles regarding the appropriate regime of justi-
fication for a given “urban question” are always perti-
nent in the city. Cities can even be classified according 
to regimes of justification: the commercial city, the in-
dustrial city, the city of political power, the city of dwel-
ling (garden city), and the city of artworks. Within each 
of these, the respective regime of justification will have 
a dominant role in disputes about urban questions. If, 
for instance, the city is known primarily as a commer-
cial one, the regime of the market will dominate urban 
politics. 
The modern way of resolving disputes over “the 
urban question”, which engage different regimes 
simultaneously, has been segregation. The idea of 
segregation stems from the industrial regime and ef-
ficiently separates problems of dwelling from problems 
of industrial production, commercial problems from 
problems of heritage, and so on. Once separated from 
each other into corresponding urban areas the public 
dispute between regimes of justification may move 
into a regime of peacefull “justesse”, where the “equiva-
lence can be present in a tacit way”68  due to the order 
of things in the given urban area.
Nevertheless, this industrialist way of resolving 
urban questions has long been disputed by the other 
regimes. For instance: the political power should be 
decentralised (a criticism against the civic regime by 
the domestic regime). Commercialised facades should 
be redesigned to give space for urban history (criti-
cism of the market regime by the domestic regime). 
Segregated and under-stimulating housing areas should 
be reintegrated with production and art (critique of 
the domestic and industrial regimes by the regime of 
inspiration and the civic regime). Such compromises 
among regimes of justification sometimes are stable 
and hold for a long time. And sometimes they produce 
urban disasters just as well as segregation. To be sure, 
typical conflicts recur over and over again. In Aarhus 
in the year 2001, for instance, tense urban disputes 
concern: a new art museum versus more social expen-
diture on the elderly (regime of inspiration vs. civic/
domestic regimes), a big new commercial centre ver-
sus the small shopkeepers and peaceful residence in 
the neighborhood (market regime vs. civic/domestic 
regime), and a new building of luxury flats disturbing 
the habitat of the residents already present (market re-
gime vs. domestic regime).
Also the project regime is present in the city. We find 
it, firstly, in situations in which it has replaced the indu-
strial regime as justification for bigger urban building 
projects. Increasingly, comprehensive urban planning 
has receded to a succession of more or less singular 
projects. 
Secondly, mobility has become an increasingly 
important issue as urban areas have become more and 
more dispersed into the countryside. The more the dif-
ference between city and country has been erased, the 
more mobility has become an urban issue. Some, like 
the French urban economist François Ascher, would 
argue that the implications of this development 
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are still not realised among planners and politici-
ans. Needless to say at this point, proximity within 
the extensive city has become a question of mobility 
and speed. An important concept in this regard is the 
concept of “urban potentiality”, which, according to 
Ascher, means “the number of possible interactions 
from the same place within a given time”.69  Such a con-
cept should, in an urban world, where intra-urban 
speed has doubled within the last 30 years, be integra-
ted into urban planning. 
Furthermore, one could look for new urban public 
spaces in the areas detested by urban planners: par-
king lots, airports and their surroundings, peripheral 
commercial centres, service stations etc. At present 
they are conceived mostly from a technical/functional 
point of view, but they should also be considered from 
a civic and aesthetic perspective.70 
Urban segregation should also be seen in the per-
spective of urban potentiality. What should be worked 
for is a more equal distribution of access to mobility. A 
real social policy in urban transport should give the 
“greatest number the means of metropolitan mobi-
lity”.71 
In this regard collective transportation is not neces-
sarily the only answer to problems of urban mobility. If 
urban zones become less and less dense, the advan-
tages of collective (industrial) transportation also di-
minish. Rather, a strategy of multi-modality in urban 
transportation seems appropriate, taking into consi-
deration that different modes of transportation per-
tain to different urban zones.72 
One cannot avoid noticing the similarities between 
the project regime and Ascher’s arguments concerning 
mobility in the city. The urban potentialities should be 
as extensive and equally distributed as information 
should be in an ethically sound project-network. John 
Urry seems to argue in the same way. 
Is this an industrial way of arguing for mobility in 
the city? Hardly so, we think; it is rather a network-ap-
proach. And isn’t this network-approach to proximity 
and mobility in the metropolis already present in Le 
Corbusier’s idea of the modern city? To be sure, the 
modern city was planned according to the ideals of an 
industrial regime of justification, and collective trans-
portation was an integral part of it. But the automobile 
was also present as a mediator of proximity by mobi-
lity.
If there is something new in the present situation in 
comparison to Le Corbusier, it seems to relate to the 
increasing need for reflexive relations in the urban 
world of auto-mobility. A relation that respects the au-
tonomy of the mobile individual while at the same time 
making the whole network of (auto)mobiles work. 
Ascher recommends a “coaching”-like procedure. An 
equal distribution of information to car drivers about 
possible bottlenecks in the flow of traffic may inspire 
some of them to change routes, so that the predicted 
bottlenecks become self-denying prophecies.73  This is 
a project-justified way of regulating mobility.
Mobility and critique
Let’s now, to conclude, return to the relationship bet-
ween critique and mobility. In Boltanski & Chiapello’s 
interpretation of the new capitalism, it seems as if all 
the freedoms dreamed of by new French philosophy 
have arrived, but not only as good news. It is as if “free-
dom comes when it no longer matters” as Bauman 
says.74  In other words, we seem to be “condemned to 
nomadism, at the very moment that we think we can 
make displacement the most effective means of sub-
version”.75  
But, significantly, the new French philosophy itself 
has been aware of this! For instance Deleuze & Guattari 
argued that the logic of capital is the logic of deterri-
torialisation, and that today control society is domina-
ting the capitalism of the disciplinary/panoptic power. 
“Control”, says Deleuze, 
is short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time 
continuous and unbounded, whereas discipline was 
long-term, infinite and discontinuous.76  
If the geography of panoptic discipline worked in terms 
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of fixed points or positions, control operates in terms of 
mobility, speed, flexibility, anonymity and contingent 
identities, in terms of “the whatever”.77 
So, where does this leave us with critique and mobi-
lity? If mobility transcends all critique, as Bauman and 
Virilio would argue, then criticism must be anti-mo-
bile: slow down; localise! 
As we have seen, however, mobility can be justified 
and criticised on the basis of mobility. In this context, 
the project regime is able to articulate the mobile 
common good. This, however, looks too innocent, 
if it is not confronted with Deleuze’s “control society”. 
But how to ground a mobile critique of control society? 
The concept of exploitation, presented by Boltanski & 
Chiapello, does not seem to work well here, because 
it is focused on the contradiction between the mobile 
and the immobile supporters of their networks. We 
are still left with an anti-mobile critique of mobility.
Where does this leave us with a mobile critique of 
mobility? In the tension between travelling light for 
the common good and light-travelling as control. And 
regarding this tension, there may still be a Deleuzian 
line of flight – speed as deviation, exile as “spiritual 
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